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CommUNIST PeNeTraTIoN of CroaTIaN 




Lately, the problem of Communist penetration of American institutions 
during World War II and the period of the “Cold War” has assumed a prominent 
place.2 Although authors do not single out Croatian Americans, it is clear that 
several of them were members of the Communist Party of the United States of 
America (CPUSA) and active in intelligence gathering for the Soviet Union.3 
American agencies became aware of that fact during the war. Surprisingly, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations and other government agencies first engaged 
in the surveillance of Croatian Americans for their alleged involvement in 
supporting the Pavelić government in the Independent State of Croatia,4 but 
gradually they came under the surveillance for their Communist activities in 
the States. 
1    This article is based on similar archival material used in writing “Čuvari svoje braće: policijsko 
nadgledanje američkih Hrvata tijekom Drugoga svjetskog rata”, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 
35/2003., br. 2, 407-430, by the author.
2   John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona. Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1999); Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet 
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Front’: 1934 1939”, this issue of Review of Croatian History.
4   See Jure Krišto, “Čuvari svoje braće: policijsko nadgledanje američkih Hrvata tijekom Drugoga 
svjetskog rata,” Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 35 (2003), no. 2: 407-430.
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The introductory section of this article is devoted to a description of 
the political situation in Yugoslavia prior to WWII and the American Croat 
community. 
The Independent State of Croatia and Croatian americans
Following the attack of Axis forces on Yugoslavia on April 6 1941, King 
Petar II and his government fled Belgrade, and ten days later the Yugoslav 
army surrendered. The quick demise of the state was a sign that a substantial 
portion of the population was deeply dissatisfied with it and did not consider 
that state worthy of defending. That was undoubtedly the case with a good 
portion of Croats. On the crest of accumulated dissatisfaction, various segments 
of political forces in Croatia began to work on the proclamation of Croatian 
independence as soon as the Yugoslav state was threatened. Indeed, Slavko 
Kvaternik, a colonel from the time of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and 
the domestic leader of the Home defender (Domobran) or Ustaša (Insurgent) 
revolutionary organization,5 read the radio message that declared the existence 
of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH – Nezavisna Država Hrvatska) on 
April 10 1941.6 The first German military units were just marching into the 
outskirts of Zagreb, while Ante Pavelić, the founding father of the Ustaše,7 was 
still in Italy negotiating the terms of the relationship of the Croatian state and 
fascist Italy. Pavelić entered Zagreb on April 15, with a group numbering less 
than a couple of hundred of the most faithful Ustaše.8 The next day, Pavelić 
organized the government, making himself the head of it and reserving for 
himself the Ministry of foreign affairs. That was a sign that the government 
was going to be authoritarian, even totalitarian in nature. The new state was 
immediately recognized by the countries of the Axis alliance.9
5   Slavko Kvaternik was born on August 25, 1878 in Komorske Moravice, but he grew up in  Vučinić 
Selo, district of Vrbovsko. After forfeiting his estate, his father Ljudevit became a postman. After his 
mandatory schooling, S. Kvaternik enrolled in the infantry military academy in Karlovac, and in 
1904 enrolled in the military academy for higher officers in Vienna. He married Olga, the doughther 
of Josip Frank, a controversial Jewish leader of the Pure Party of (State) Right. Pursuing his military 
career, in 1916 Kvaternik became a wing adjutant of general Svetozar Borojević, the commander of 
the Third Army. During the First World War he was part of the army command at the Soča front. In 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Kvaternik”s military career was inhibited and in 1920 
he was retired. He joined the Croat Party of (State) Right, and in 1938 he became a member of the 
nationalist group “Uzdanica,” which in 1939 began publishing the newspaper Hrvatski narod. 
6   Narodne novine, no. 1, April 11, 1941.
7   This is a plural form of the Croatian noun Ustaša. I use this form, even though Ustaši, the form in 
Serbian, is frequently encountered in literature.
8   Ante Moškov, Pavelićevo doba (Split, 1999), p. 212, writes that Pavelić arrived “before dawn” and 
reports that the Ustaše were discontent with such a conspirative entrance into the capital. 
9   F. Čulinović, Dokumenti o Jugoslaviji. Historijat od osnutka zajedničke države do danas (Zagreb, 
1968), pp. 391-392; Ante Pavelić. 100 godina, p. 26. For a discussion on whether Hungary recog-
Review of Croatian History 5/2009, no.1, 169 - 188
171
Most Croats were elated when they heard the proclamation of the NDH. 
The Catholic Church hierarchy and the lower clergy concurred with the 
people.10 The reason for the Croats’ joy was their separation from Serbia and 
the establishment of a state of their own, a dream of many generations fulfilled. 
However, disappointments soon crept in and squeezed out the satisfaction. 
The Germans and Italians defined their political and territorial interests 
within Croatia, thus dividing the country in half and placing the government 
of “independent” Croatia under their control, especially regarding military 
and other security matters. The Italians, moreover, immediately annexed a 
good portion of the Adriatic littoral and most of the islands, and later imposed 
their military rule over a major portion of “their” part of the NDH.11 These 
arrangements were agreed upon by the treaties signed in Rome on May 18, 
1941.
If that was not a sufficient source of frustration, the Orthodox Serbs 
mounted an armed revolt against the NDH and joined the Chetnik formations 
of Draža Mihailović to fight for the restitution of the Monarchy (actually for 
the creation of Great Serbia). In addition, on June 22, 1941, the day that Hitler 
attacked the Soviet Russia, the Croatian Communists began their uprising, and 
also fought against the NDH. They also wanted the renewal of Yugoslavia, but 
modelled after the Communist Soviet Union. The Croat Communists were, 
therefore, interested in a Soviet style revolution that would be achieved on 
the entire territory of Yugoslavia. Thus, the entire territory of the NDH was 
engulfed in civil war, in which the fighting sides forged alliances and just as 
easily broke them. In addition to the presence of German and Italian military 
forces, both Communist-led Partisans and Chetniks fought the Croatian 
regular army, while at the same time Partisans and Chetniks tried to eliminate 
each other.
On top of everything, Pavelić’s regime introduced extremely bad policies 
in the areas and domains in which it was allowed to operate. The Serbs were 
excluded from prac tically all government employment and from work in some 
nized Croatia before Germany see: Milan Blažeković, “Proces protiv nadbiskupa Stepinca i med-
junarodni status Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (1941.-1945. ,” Stepinac mu je ime. Zbornik uspomena, 
svjedočanstava i dokumenata, ed. by Vinko Nikolić (Barcelona: Hrvatska revija, 1978), pp. 323-367 
(335).
10   Jure Krišto, Sukob simbola. Politika, vjere i ideologije u Nezavisnoj Državi Hrvatskoj (Zagreb: 
Nakladni zavod Globus, 2001), pp. 38-39.
11   Zdravko Dizdar, “Italian Policies toward Croatians in Occupied Territories during the Second 
World War,” Review of Croatian History 1 (2005) no. 1: 179-210; Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revo-
lution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945. The Chetniks (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), p. 100; 
Frank P. Verna, “Notes on Italian Rule on Dalmatia under Bastianini, 1941-1943,” The International 
History Review 12 (1990): 528-529; see also the Proceedings of a conference on the subject: Talijan-
ska uprava na hrvatskom prostoru i egzodus Hrvata (Pula – Zagreb, 2001).
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professions, especially the mass media.12 At the end of June the government 
began organizing detention and work-camps to which it sent Serbs and other 
opponents of the regime. On April 30, 1941 racial laws were proclaimed 
laying the foundation for the anti-Jewish measures that ensued. The Jews were 
ordered to wear yellow armbands, forbidden to sign business contracts, while 
their property was seized. Two weeks earlier, on April 14, 1941 the synagogue 
in Osijek had been burnt down; later the synagogue of Zagreb and other towns 
were destroyed.13 Many Jews (especially members and sympathizers of the 
Communist party) and Gypsies were sent to the labour camps.14 
American Croats found themselves in a very difficult situation and it 
worsened when on December 14, 1941 the head of the Independent State 
of Croatia declared war on the United States, three days after Germany and 
Italy had done the same, and certainly under their pressure. American Croats 
had strong organizations committed to the idea of Croatian independence. 
In 1928 they founded Hrvatsko kolo (Croatian Circle), which supported the 
Croatian movement for independence.15 The Circle had branches throughout 
the United States while the New York-based newspaper, Hrvatski list i Danica 
hrvatska (Croatian Newspaper and the Croatian Morning Star), edited by 
the Circle’s first president Ivan Krešić, became the Circle’s organ.16 In 1933, a 
splinter group sided with the European Domobran-Ustaša movement,17 which 
voiced its political goals through the newspaper Nezavisna Hrvatska Država 
(Independent Croatian State). The monthly was published in Berlin, and five 
hundred copies were sent to Ante Došen in New York, into which he inserted 
an American section and sent them to final destinations.18 When the Nazis 
banned the paper in Germany in 1934, it was decided that the paper of the 
12   Inde pendent State of Croatia, Ministry of Justice and Religion, Zbornik zakona i naredaba Neza-
visne Države Hrvatske – 1941; Jozo Tomasevich, The Chetniks, p. 106.
13   Surprisingly, the Jewish Religious Congregation was active during the entire duration of the 
NDH, see: Harriet Pass Freidenreich, The Jews in Yugoslavia. A Quest for Community (Philadelphia: 
The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1979), p. 191. See also: J. Kristo, “The Catholic Church 
and the Jews in the Independent State of Croatia,” Review of Croatian History, 3 (2007), no. 1:13-
47.
14   Narcisa Lengel Krizman, “Camps for Jews in the Independent State of Croatia,” Anti-Semitism, 
Holocaust, Anti-Fascism (Zagreb: Zagreb Jewish Community, 1997), pp. 89-101.
15   Membership of that organization included several Croatian Catholic priests: Davorin Krmpotić, 
Mirko Kaić, Bosiljko Bekavac, Ilija Severović, Milan Hranilović, Ivan Stipanović, Oskar Šuster, and 
Leon Medić. 
16   See Josip Kraja, “The Croatian Circle, 1928-1946: Chronology and Reminiscences,” Journal of 
Croatian Studies 5-6 (1964-65): 145-204. Among members of the Circle were mons. Ivan Stipanović, 
Ivan Krešić, Josip Kraja, Kuzma Kuharić, Davorin Krmpotić, Milan Bilić, Ante Došen, etc.
17   Jere Jareb, ed., Političke uspomene i rad dra Branimira Jelića (Cleveland: Mirko Šamija, 1982), 
p. 88; cf. Ivan Čizmić, Hrvati u životu Sjedinjenih Američkih Država (Zagreb: Globus, 1982), pp. 
293-95.
18   Jere Jareb, ed., Političke uspomene i rad dra Branimira Jelića, p. 66. Other sympathizers of the 
Domobran (Home defender) in New York were Lucian Reicherzer and Levar, ibid., p. 71.
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same name, but of a larger format, should be published in the United States.19 
The weekly Nezavisna Hrvatska Država – the Independent State of Croatia was 
indeed founded in Pittsburgh in 1934. Its first editor was Luka Grbić.20  
The very existence of the Independent State of Croatia and, even more so, 
its policies, were problems in themselves. In addition, the Serb anti-Croatian 
propaganda in the United States and elsewhere portrayed the Croats and the 
NDH in a very unfavorable light and thus put them in a defensive position. At 
the instigation of the Yugoslav legation, the Federal Bureau of Investigations 
(FBI) began surveying Croatian newspapers, prominent individuals, and 
organizations.21 
Accordingly, American Croats excelled in an overt expression of American 
patriotism. On October 25, 1941, the Croatian Circle issued a Manifest in 
which they condemned the creators of the Independent State of Croatia, the 
“Yugoslav fighters” and their “Communists counselors,” the “official Yugoslav 
propaganda under the sponsorship of the Serbs,” but also the followers of 
Domobran. They urged the Croats in the United States to “follow our President 
Roosevelt and our adopted homeland.”22 When the United States of America 
entered the war on December 8, 1941, the President of the CFU, J. D. Butković, 
sent a telegram to President Roosevelt declaring loyalty and promising support 
of all American Croats for the war effort.23 That did not stop the FBI from 
undertaking the surveillance of Croatian organizations and newspapers.24 
The office of the editor of the Sloga Hrvata, L. Grbić, was even raided in 
the beginning of 1942, while many issues of that Croatian newspaper were 
confiscated.25
from Pan-Slavism and yugoslavism to the Support of Communism
The war in Europe, in which the United States was an active participant and 
by which most Americans of Slavic origin were in one way or another affected, 
19   Jere Jareb, ed., Političke uspomene i rad dra Branimira Jelića, p. 85.
20   George J. Prpic, The Croatian Immigrants in America (New York: Philosophical Li-
brary,  1971), Here, I cite its Croatian translation Hrvati u Americi (Zagreb: Hrvatska 
matica iseljenika, 1997), p. 216.
21   See: J. Krišto, “Čuvari svoje braće.”
22   The President Ivan Krešić and the Board members Ivan Šipak, Stjepan Klinger, Kuz-
ma Kuharić, Ana Grgurić, and Josip Kraja signed the Manifest, G. J. Prpic, Hrvati u 
Americi, pp. 232-233.
23   G. J. Prpic, Hrvati u Americi, p. 233.
24   See the report on CFU of February 10, 1942, Federal Bureau of Investigation, National 
Archives (hereafter: NA) MP 660H.20211/17 PS/HM.
25   G. J. Prpic, Hrvati u Americi, 234.
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evoked in those Slavic Americans “Pan-Slavic” feelings. The fact that the United 
States considered the Soviet Union an ally was not the least contributing factor 
to that disposition. It was, of course, in the interest of the Soviet Union to 
mobilize all Slavs in the campaign that could only strengthen its fight against 
Germany and eventual dominance in the “Slavic” part of Europe. 
Parallel to those developments was the growing influence of the 
Communist Party of the United States, and among Croats and Slovenes a 
growing predilection for the struggle of the “Yugoslav Partisans.” This situation 
provided the right atmosphere for the organizing of the Pan Slavic Congress of 
the United States on April 25 and 26, 1942 in Detroit, Michigan. The Croats 
contributed greatly to the Congress; J. D. Butković, the President of the CFU, 
was the head of the Preparation Committee for the Congress.26 
Soon after, preparations for a Congress of American Croats began - a 
gathering that was planned for February 1943. The American Croatian Congress, 
the biggest gathering of American Croats, was indeed held in Chicago on 
February 20 to 21, 1943. 
The FBI chief J. E. Hoover sent a report to A. A. Berle of a confidential 
informant on the proceedings of the Congress.27 The general tone of the 
Congress was provided, according to Hoover’s informants, by its President John 
D. Butković in his opening statement, which contained all traditional Croatian 
ideological themes with a bent toward concrete historical circumstances. He 
left no doubt that the American Croatian Congress was wholeheartedly for the 
“reestablishment of an independent Yugoslavia” and that it condemned “the 
acts of the Nazi dominated Ustashi’s.”28 He also claimed that “Croatians are 
entitled to exist as a national group,” but not necessarily “as an independent 
state” and praised “Mother Russia,” “the great leader among the Slav people of 
Europe.”29 There was no doubt in Butković”s mind that Mihailovich’s Chetniks 
were “fighting for the reestablishment of a “greater Serbia” rather than the 
reestablishment of the former Yugoslav state.”30 Butković also condemned the 
accusations against the Croatian people as being saboteurs, fifth columnists, 
and so on, which were emanating from the Yugoslav government in exile 
and propagated by the organ of the Serbian National Defense Organization, 
Srbobran.31
26    G. J. Prpic, Hrvati u Americi, 236.
27   Federal Bureau of Investigation, not dated, NA 660H.20211/29 PS/TL, with the Enclosure: 
“American Croatian Congress, Chicago, Illinois, February 20 and 21, 1943”. J. E. Hoover sent an-
other report to A. A. Berle in October 1944, see Federal Bureau of Investigation, File No. 100-5699, 
NA MP 860H.00/10-1744.
28    Ibid., American Croatian Congress, p. 1.
29   Ibid.
30   Ibid.
31   Ibid., p. 1-2.
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The first speaker at the Congress was Dr. Ivan Šubašić (Subasic), the Viceroy 
of Croatia and a member of the Yugoslav government in exile. The FBI”s 
informant pointed to the conclusion of his speech as the most important point: 
“the only government which would effectively function in the reestablished 
Yugoslav State … would be a federal system composed of representatives of 
the Serbs, Croatians and Slovenes, with equal rights for these various national 
groups.”32 Being a follower of the Yugoslav ideology, Šubašić could not even 
imagine an independent Croatian state with a democratic government, and 
different from the one established by Pavelić. In the manner of a typical 
representative of Croatian minimalists, he advocated “the incorporation 
of Croatia into a Yugoslav State which will assure the Croatian people fair 
treatment and equal opportunities.”33 He was, one might say, begging others to 
give him what he refused to take himself.
Rev. Vorslov Kačinović (Kachinovich) - a Serbian Orthodox priest and, 
obviously, a sympathizer of the Communists who led the Yugoslav Partisans - 
pleaded that “Yugoslavs” not believe that all Partisans are Communists.34 His 
admission that Croats were not treated as equals in Yugoslavia was seconded by 
another Serb, Dr. Sava Kosanović (Kosanovich), a former Yugoslav Minister. 
Speaker after speaker expanded on more or less the same line of arguments 
from the condemnation of the present day Croatian government to the 
expression of the hope that Yugoslavia would be reestablished as a democratic 
state. More than one speaker also praised the Partisans, while the final speaker, 
Dr. Zlatko Baloković (Balokovich), a successful Croatian violinist, read a 
resolution calling for greetings to be sent from the Congress to the Yugoslav 
National Liberation Army, which was accepted “with a thunderous ovation by 
the audience which rose to its feet as a gesture of support.”35
The informant felt the need to point out that “no priests were present among 
the delegates,” even though Croats are predominately Roman Catholics.36 That 
note is very significant. The representatives of the Catholic Church in Croatia, 
just as the Catholic Church in general, knew that the victory of Communism 
anywhere would create a situation of persecution for the Church, such as it 
existed in Communist Russia.  The Catholic Church in Croatia also knew that 
the organizing force behind the “Yugoslav Partisans” were Communists, whose 
aim was the creation of a Communist Yugoslavia, modeled after the Soviet 
Union, and that Croats would be in an even worse situation than in monarchical 
Yugoslavia. Obviously, the Church’s general feeling was shared by the Catholic 
priests working with the Catholic American Croats. Catholic priests did not 
32    Ibid., p. 2.
33    Ibid., p. 2.
34    Ibid., p. 3.
35    Ibid., p. 10. 
36    Ibid., 11-12.
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attend the Congress of American Croats because they felt that the Communist 
forces were behind its organization and that it was being planned as support 
for the “Yugoslav Partisans” led by the Communists. Indeed, the Congress 
founded the Council of American Croats, headed by Zlatko Baloković, whose 
task it was, among other things, to gather support for the National Liberation 
Front, i.e., fighting units of the Partisans led by the Communists.37 
The representatives of the Catholic Church were not the only ones 
suspicious of Croatian activities in support of Tito’s Partisans. On February 6, 
1943, Ohio Senator William M. Boyd drew A. A. Berle’s attention to the fact 
that Vinko Vuk, the Treasurer of the CFU, and Mark Vinsky, the Secretary 
of the Sponsoring Committee of the Croatian Congress, were signatories of a 
statement that appeared in the official organ of the Communist Party Narodni 
Glasnik.38 Boyd bolstered his claims by enclosing a copy of that statement as 
well as a copy of the resolution issued by the CFU at its Supreme Board meeting 
in Gary, Indiana.
The CFU gathered in Chicago on its sixth convention that lasted for 
twelve days beginning on August 31, 1943. There was strong support from the 
Congress of American Croats, which also meant support for the “Yugoslav 
Partisans” and their Communist leadership.
In May 1943, American Croats from the state of Michigan, organized 
in the Croatian-American Alliance of Michigan, sent a memorandum to 
President F. D. Roosevelt in which they called for a joint American-British-
Russian mission to Yugoslavia to investigate who was fighting against the 
Nazis and “striving for national unity of the Yugoslav people – Serbs, Croats, 
and Slovenes.”39 The signatories left no doubt, however, that they were in favor 
of the Peoples” Liberation Movement led by Ribar and Tito, who “will gladly 
help the American Invasion Army … in order to hasten the joint Victory over 
the Nazis.” They obviously disregarded information that Tito’s Liberation 
Movement was primarily a struggle for the establishment of a Soviet-type 
state.
reexamination of american Policy towards the belligerent Sides in 
yugoslavia
Alongside the developments in the community of American Croats, there 
were similar developments in the community of American Serbs and, most 
importantly, changes in official policy towards those groups of American 
37   See G. J. Prpic, Hrvati u Americi, 238.
38   W. M. Boyd to A. A. Berle, Cleveland, February 6, 1943, NA MP 860H.00 CROATIAN ACTIVI-
TIES IN U. S./143 PS.BMB 
39   NA MP 860H.00/1478 with the attached Memorandum I/2. The Memorandum was signed by 
Matt Goretta, President, Mark Kramarich, Secretary, and Slavko Barkovich, Vice President.
Review of Croatian History 5/2009, no.1, 169 - 188
177
citizens. From the beginning of war, the State Department was under the 
constant barrage of the Yugoslav Ambassador Konstantin Fotitch who did not 
hesitate to present to American officials falsehoods against Croats and their 
American organizations.40 The American Srbobran was Fotitch’s mouthpiece 
and a propagator of anti-Croatian rhetoric. 
In the first part of 1942, the Department of State began to suspect Fotić 
and was considering investigating his activities. Even earlier, the Assistant 
Secretary, A. A. Berle, received a translation of an article in “a Yugoslav 
newspaper” entitled “Who is Minister Fotitch Representing Today,” which he 
forwarded to J. E. Hoover. On May 13, 1942, the Coordinator of Information 
in the State Department DeWitt C. Poole wrote to Harold Hoskins that “well 
informed persons” accused Fotić of being behind Serb agitations in the States 
and that he should be required to be more cooperative.41
One of the most interesting documents in that respect is the report, 
probably from the first part of 1942, compiled by an official of the Red Cross 
to the Executive Committee regarding the “Yugoslav situation.”42 The Red 
Cross officials became concerned that “American Yugoslavs” could not collect 
a sufficient amount of money in the war relief campaign because of the fact 
that “there is a growing element that no longer supports the idea of a future 
‘Yugoslavia’ but urges a post-war independent Croatia.”43 The report estimates 
that responsibility for this lies in the “anti-Croatian propaganda being carried 
out in the Serbian press in this country.”44 The problem also lies in the fact that 
although there is a minority of Serbs among “Yugoslavs,” “practically every 
Yugoslav government post in this country is held by a Serb.”45 The consequence 
of that situation is that Croats were not giving money any longer to the Yugoslav 
relief fund because they were increasingly convinced that it was nothing but a 
front for the Yugoslav Legation in Washington and its advocator for a Greater 
Serbia, Fotitch. The situation was getting so bad, according to this report, that a 
leading Croatian newspaper Hrvatski svijet (Croatian World) expressed sorrow 
for those “well intentioned American Friends” who have become “‘dupes’ of 
Serbian politicians.”46 As some wealthy Croats argued, put bluntly, Americans 
“were definitely pro-Serb.”47 
We do not know whether the Serbian People’s Club was instrumental in 
changes in American domestic policy, but there are indications that some 
40   For details, see: J. Krišto, “Čuvari svoje braće”, passim.
41   NA MP 860H.00 CROATIAN ACTIVITIES IN UNITED STATES/122½ PS/MEL
42   There are no signatures on the document in the Microfilm Publications of the NA, Roll 24.
43   Ibid., p. 1.
44   Ibid.
45   Ibid., p. 2.
46   Ibid., pp. 2-3.
47   Ibid., 3.
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changes in American policy were taking place. On June 19, 1942, Jovan 
Duchich of the Yugoslav Embassy requested that June 28, the Vidovdan, be 
declared Chetniks Day in America.48 The Department of State gave a negative 
response to the initiative. 
In 1942, even some Serbian groups in the USA began to realize the extent 
of the negative role of some Serbian anti-Croat propaganda. At a meeting on 
December 20, 1942 in New York City, the Serbian People’s Club adopted a 
Declaration by which it denounced “the disruptive work of certain Serbian 
elements in this country, under the leadership of Konstantin Fotitch, the 
Executive Board of the Serbian National Federation, and the Serbian Defense 
Committee.”49 The Club emphasized the negative writing of the American 
Srbobran, which was again done under the auspices of the Yugoslav Ambassador 
K. Fotitch, and has become “the center of deliberate falsehoods.”50 This Serbian 
club called the people around Srbobran the “pro-fascist gang,” “faithful servants 
of the Axis,” the “pro Hitler paper” and invited the USA government “to once 
and for all take a position against the treasonable activities of the American 
Srbobran and its editors.”51
In 1943 American agencies looked closer at the activities of several Serbian 
groups and individuals in the United States and realized that they were 
propagating ideas of “Greater Serbia,” which could be detrimental to American 
interests. Probably one of the most thorough examinations of those groups 
was the 12-page long report by the Foreign Nationality Groups of the Office of 
Strategic Services (OSS) dated June 3, 1943. 52 
The concerns of American officials were multiple: the advocators of Greater 
Serbia did not envisage the reconstitution of Yugoslavia after the war, in fact, 
they envisaged a substantially enlarged Serbia that would include all territories 
where Serbs reside, with King Peter at its head, and they could not envisage 
union with Croats again. They supported Mihailovich’s campaign, which 
put them “into a position that is not only anti-Partisan but also anti-Soviet 
Union.”53 The officer identified the propagators of Greater Serbia as a fraternal 
organization of the Serb National Federation and Serbian National Defense 
48   I have a copy of the document.
49   George Jovicevich to Cordell Hull, January 5, 1943, NA 860H.20211/23 PS/TL.
50   Ibid., Enclosure: Resolution, p. 1.
51   Ibid., p. 2. Almost at the same time, the Serbian National Defense Organization of Ecorse, Michi-
gan issued a Resolution “against the Croatian Congress” which was planned to be held in Chicago. 
That Serbian group accused Croatia of being a “puppet state,” which was “assisting the Axis – Ger-
mans and Italians” and declared “war against the United States and the Allied Nations.”
52   Foreign Nationality Groups in the United Sates to the Director of Office of Strategic Services, 
NA MP 860H.20211/32 PS/TL. The principal author of that report was Sava Kosanovich, former 
Minister of State of Yugoslavia, see: Office of Strategic Services, S-25, June 5, 1943, signed by DeWitt 
C. Poole, NA MP 860H.20211/33 PS/TL. 
53   Ibid., p. 1.
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Council, with the daily Amerikanski Srbobran acting as their mouthpiece.54 
The report noted that “the Serb community in the United States stems almost 
exclusively from Croatian territories.”55 One of the individuals most involved 
in that propaganda was Branko Pekich, the very person who previously 
served as a “Yugoslav” informer to the FBI agents, and the other was L. C. 
Christopher (Luka Kristoforović). Behind the entire endeavor was the Yugoslav 
Ambassador in Washington, K. Fotić and the head of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church in the United States Bishop Dionisije, “an official on the payroll of the 
Yugoslav Government.” Jovan Dučić (Yovan Duchich), diplomatic official of 
the Yugoslav Government, was also part of the team before his death in May 
1943.56 
With the help of the Special War Policies Unit of the Department of Justice, 
the analyst of the above report noted two phases in Greater Serbian propaganda 
reflected in the writings of Srbobran. The first, from November 1941 to the 
reorganization of the Yugoslav Government in exile in London during January 
1943, was marked by efforts “to discredit the Croats and exalt the Serbs.”57 The 
second phase extended from January 1943 to the time of writing the report, 
and was marked by an emphasis on the impossibility of Yugoslavia and by 
a “justification for a post-war Greater Serbia.”58 The centerpiece of the first 
phase was the Memorandum of the Serbian Orthodox Church to General 
Dankelmann, German military representative in Serbia, in which Orthodox 
Bishops accused the Croats of the massacre of 800.000 Serbs. Since then, Serbs 
had began promoting the idea that they “must be rewarded for their sufferings 
and that the Croats must bear the consequences of their crimes.”59 Expectedly, 
the malignment of Croats did not stop during this second phase, because “the 
current effort apparently aims to discredit all Croat leadership in the United 
States and abroad.” Given Kosanovich’s advocacy of the renewal of Yugoslavia, 
he added that Serbs around Srbobran, principally K. Fotitch, are also opposed 
to “all who favor the restoration of Yugoslavia.”60 
As far as the program of the creation of Greater Serbia is concerned, 
Srbobran envisaged a country that is “about one-third smaller than Yugoslavia” 
and would include all Serbs in one state, which would practically mean inclusion 
of the following regions: Bosnia, Herzegovina, South Serbia (Macedonia), 
Dalmatia, Banovina, Banat, Bačka, Kordun, Srijem, Lika, and Slavonia. In any 
54   Ibid., p. 2.
55   Ibid., p. 3.
56   Ibid., p. 2. Dučić was the author of the pamphlet “Federalizam i centralizam”, published late in 
1942, in which a program of Great Serbia was presented, along with accusations against Croats.
57   Ibid., p. 4.
58   Ibid.
59   Ibid., p. 5.
60   Ibid., p. 9.
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event, Greater Serbia would be “without a Croat.”61 If any Croats should remain 
in the future Greater Serbia, they will, like other minorities such as “Slovenes, 
Jews and Mohammedans,” receive as much rights as “they show themselves 
capable of enjoying.”62 Srbobran did not miss the opportunity to emphasize that 
Serbs are “the most democratic people in the Balkans,” but it also advocated 
the exchange of people in “mixed areas,”63 another idea that proponents of 
Greater Serbia toyed with when the program of “ethnic cleansing” could not 
secure “clean areas”. Srbobran envisaged the possibility of the federalization of 
Greater Serbia and Greece.64 
The analyst (Kosanović) pointed out that American Serbs also attacked 
Croats on religious grounds by claiming that the Croats were aiming to create 
a Greater Croatia out of territories on which “there are some Catholic elements 
in those territories.”65 He pointed out that Serbian Orthodox priests accused 
Catholic priests of hating the Orthodox religion and having participated in 
massacres of Orthodox Serbs. Thus, Rev. Danilo Kozomara considered the 
situation in the NDH as a religious war. It was Srbobran that published Prvislav 
Grisogono”s supposed letter to the Zagreb Archbishop A. Stepinac, in which a 
Catholic supposedly accuses Catholic priests of participating in crimes against 
Orthodox Serbs in Croatia. That “letter” was later proved to be a forgery.66
The american Policy and the Threat of Communism
All the activities of Croatian and Serbian communities raised suspicions 
of United States Government agencies, especially the FBI. These agencies, 
therefore, continued the surveillance of various organizations of American 
Croats in spite of their declarations of loyalty and effective actions in collecting 
money for the war effort. The FBI reported on attempts by the Communist 
elements to gain control of the Croatian Fraternal Union67 and on the violation 
of various statues by the Croatian Home Defenders.68 The American Consulate 
61   Ibid., p. 5.
62   Ibid., p. 8.
63   Ibid.
64   Ibid., p. 6.
65   Ibid., p. 7.
66   Ljubo BOBAN, Kontroverze iz povijesti Jugoslavije, vol. II, 2nd edition (Zagreb, 1989), pp. 301-
311.
67   Department of Justice, September 14, 1943, NA, 860H.20211/36. The State Department had a 
detailed report of the proceedings of the CFU Convention, which indicates that American officials 
knew about the penetration of the Communists into the CFU, but  they estimated that the Com-
munists “achieved a mixed victory.” See OSS, Foreign Nationality Groups in the United States, NA 
MP FW 860H.00/1542½.
68   Department of Justice, October 13, 1943, NA, 860H.20211/46.
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in Fort William-Port Arthur of Ontario, Canada requested information on 
whether Walter Grgurich, John Krznaric, and Mato Raguz, who attended the 
sixth convention of the CFU in Chicago had Communist affiliations.69 The 
Consulate in Windsor, Canada informed the Secretary of State that Victor 
Filipich, who attended the same convention, had Communist connections.70 
There were other similar requests and reports. 
American officials had, of course, plenty of information about the situation 
in Croatia. An illustrative type of information is the conversation with a Croatian 
professor at the University of Zagreb and a member of the Peasant Party, which 
had reached the State Department via the American Consulate General in 
Istanbul, Turkey.71 The unnamed professor described the composition and the 
activities of the Partisans and the very negative disposition of the population 
towards them. He also described communist propaganda, which was successful 
with the youth.
In spite of such information, towards the end of 1943 the American 
Government officially declared, at the Teheran Conference (November 28 to 
December 1, 1943), that it would stop supporting Mihailovich’s Chetniks and 
begin assisting Josip Broz Tito’s Partisans. Tito, for his part, planned the second 
conference of the Antifascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia 
(AVNOJ) at the time of the Teheran Conference (November 29, 1943). Tito”s 
conference in the Bosnian town of Jajce proclaimed the founding of Yugoslavia 
as a federation in which the rights of its composing nations (Croats, Serbs, 
Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins) would be guaranteed.72 The 
conference did not announce, of course, that it was completely manipulated by 
the Communists, who hid their intentions under democratic rhetoric.
Such a political development had a great impact on American Croats. The 
Council of American Croats (CAC) held its first conference on January 23, 
1944 in Pittsburgh, where it was decided to establish a Croatian Committee for 
War Assistance, to collect $1,000.000 as assistance to Yugoslavia, and to send 
food, clothing, and medicine to the war-torn country.73
Towards the end of 1944, the FBI and other American agencies began 
paying closer attention to the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS), the Communists, 
and their mutual relationship. The reason was the position and activity of 
69   H. T. Goodier to Secretary of State, Fort William, December 29, 1943, NA, 860H.20211/50 PS/
LH.
70   G. K. Donald to Secretary of State, No. 1259, Windsor, Ontario, January 4, 1944, NA 
860H.20211/50 PS/LH.
71   American Consulate General, Istanbul, Turkey, May 26, 1943, NA MP 860H.00/1487 and 
860.H.00/1498 PS/HWL.
72   See Jill Irvine, The Croat Question: Partisan Politics in the Formation of the Yugoslav Socialist State 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993).
73   G. J. Prpic, Hrvati u Americi, 239.
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former Croatian Viceroy Ivan Šubašić. Affiliated with the HSS, Šubašić was 
a member of the Yugoslav Government in exile and the choice of British and 
American politicians for the premiership of Yugoslavia in a compromise deal 
with the Communist Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito. Šubašić was chosen by 
the Allies in order to secure a democratic system in post-war Yugoslavia. On 
September 9, 1944, the Chicago FBI agent Charles J. Prelsnik wrote a report on 
I. Šubašić and his HSS.74 His informants attributed Šubašić’s recent successes 
to the strength of the HSS and minimized the infiltration of the Communists 
into the party. Prelsnik’s informant “CGO-5353” told him that the followers of 
the HSS “recognize Marshal TITO as their military leader, but would not be 
satisfied to live under a Communistic rule in Croatia.”75 The informant did not 
believe that the leader of the Chicago Croatian Communists, Mato Brzovich, 
was very influential among the followers of the Croatian Peasant Party. 
Another informant confirmed that assessment and admitted that Communists 
were attempting to smear the “Peasants” in order to have a leading role among 
Croats.76
Supreme Council of american Croats
The Croats who still hoped for an independent Croatia apparently did not 
disappear, and those in the United States were likewise under the watchful 
eye of the FBI. On November 11, 1944 Howard A. King sent a report from 
Indianapolis, Indiana on the Supreme Council of American Croats - SCAC 
(Vrhovno vijeće Američkih Hrvata), also known as the Supreme Council of 
Croats.77 His informant “T-1” did not know much about that new organization 
of American Croats, but he knew that an organization of an identical name 
already existed in Gary, Indiana, around the newspaper Naša nada – Our 
Hope, the organ of the Croatian Catholic Union. The informant supplied some 
information, however, about the editor of Naša nada. Although the editorship 
was in the name of Helen Borić, her husband Stanislav Borić was the actual 
editor of the newspaper, but his name could not appear as editor since he was 
not an American citizen. The informant was sure “that STANISLAV BORIC 
was sent by PAVELICH to the United States to stir up trouble and that he has 
been a troublemaker ever since” and that “he was in favor of Hitler and not 
favorable to the policies of the United States.”78 King emphasized, however, 
that the Cleveland and Indianapolis FBI Offices conducted a “considerable 
investigation” on S. Borić and found out that he was “a representative of the 
74   Federal Bureau of Investigation, File No. 100-15088, September 9, 1944, NA, 860H.01/10-2644 
CS/D; cf. J. E. Hoover to A. A. Berle, October 25, 1944, Ibid.
75   Ibid., p. 1.
76   Ibid., p. 2.
77   Federal Bureau of Investigation, File No. 105-46, NA 860H.01/11-3044.
78   Ibid., pp. 2-3.
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Hrvatski Radisa[79] until October, 1940 when he became an organizer with the 
Croatian Catholic Union in Gary, Indiana.”80 King also wrote: “Prior to October 
of 1940, he is known to have collected funds on two occasions in Pittsburgh for 
the express purpose of sending these funds to Dr. ANTON PAVELICH. He is 
also alleged to have stated to informants that Adolf Hitler is a great leader.”81
If H. A. King from Indianapolis did not know much about the Supreme 
Council of American Croats, Robert E. Abbe of Pittsburgh had more 
information. On November 13, 1944, Abbe sent a twenty-page report on, 
among other things, the name change of the organization (Supreme Croatian 
National Council).82 Abbe also indicated that his informant stated that the 
majority of the delegates at the founding convention were “members of the 
Croatian Catholic Clergy.”83 Interestingly, Abbe’s informant, apparently the 
same “T-1” informant used by King in a report from Indianapolis, confused 
this organization of American Croats with the Council of American Croats 
founded by the Congress of American Croats held in Chicago in February 
1943. Actually, the said convention gave strong support to the Council of 
American Croats, but the motivation was the support of the latter for the 
“Yugoslav Partisans” and the creation of a new Yugoslavia, and not because of 
the alleged support for an independent Croatia. It should be pointed out that 
the convention of the Congress of American Croats that founded the Council 
of American Croats was attended by no Catholic priests, while the Supreme 
Croatian National Council was supposedly backed and even organized by 
Croatian Catholic priests. 
Abbe”s informant “T-3” made some useful clarification. At the CFU 
convention in Chicago a group of CFU prominent members, dissatisfied with 
the influence of Communists in the CFU, met secretly and formed the Supreme 
Committee of American Croats (SCAC).84 This information is confirmed by 
Rev. I. Stipanović, the President, who published an article about the foundation 
of the SCAC in Hrvatski list of January 8, 1944.85 The elected members of the 
SCAC were: Rev. I. Stipanović, of Youngstown, Pennsylvania, President; Rev. 
Silvije Grubišić, of Chicago, Secretary; Kuzma Kuharić of Campbell, Ohio; 
Filip Pauli of Milwaukee; Wm. Piškulić of St. Louis; Mrs. F. Skukan of Chicago, 
Florijan Tumbri of Cleveland; and Rev. Dr. V. Vančik of Cleveland.86
79   The FBI investigation indicated that “Hrvatski Radisa was … an organization in Croatia to pro-
mote the well-being of youths by providing fields for their education, particularly in the skilled 
trades and in craftsmanship.” (Ibid., p. 3).
80   Ibid., p. 3.
81   Ibid., p. 3.
82   Department of Justice, FBI, File No. 105-23, no ref..
83   Ibid., p. 1.
84   Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
85   The article is reproduced in the same report, pp. 4-6.
86   Ibid., p. 7.
J. KRIŠTO, Communist penetration of Croatian american organizations during world war II
184
The informant “T-1” stated that this new organization of American Croats 
“is the same as the HRVATSKI DOMOBRAN and [that] they will operate 
underground.”87 He also mentioned some men from the October 18, 1944 
founding meeting as being elected officials even though they were not actually 
elected then: Father Ljubo Čuvalo of Ambridge, Pennsylvania, President; 
Rudolf Erić of Akron, Ohio, vice-president; and J. J. Miller of Barberton, 
Ohio, Member of the Board. The informant noted that Father Čuvalo, in a 
long telephone conversation with Father David Zrno, the Provincial of the 
Croatian Franciscans in the United States, asked for permission to accept the 
Presidency.88 The informant “T-2” named these priests as actual or potential 
members of the subject organization: I. Stipanović, [Mijo] Domlodovac, 
Dobroslav [Božić], B. Sorić, and [Franjo] Čuturić. The Board of Trustees 
comprised Most Rev. Milan Hranilović of Akron, Ohio, President; John Mose of 
McKeesport, Pennsylvania, Director; Nikola (Maar ? – illegible), Director; and 
Ivan Bakšić of Detroit, Michigan, Substitute.89 The informant stated that “the 
program of the organization is the same as that of ANTE PAVELICH, with the 
exception that the leaders are against PAVELICH due to his collaboration with 
the Nazis.”90 He also claimed that the new organization “will work through the 
Croatian Catholic Union” and that “none of the officers, members or directors 
of the SUPREME CROATIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL were pro-Fascist or 
against the United States government in any manner.”91
It appears that the above-mentioned Abbe informants were influenced 
by the propaganda writings of the Communists who surrounded the CFU 
in Pittsburgh and its local chapters. This is, in fact, what George Ramušćak, 
National Secretary of the Croatian Catholic Union expressly stated. He thought 
that the FBI agents confused the Supreme Council of American Croats with 
the Hrvatski Domobran.92 Contrary to those informants, he said that “this 
organization [SCAC], while completely loyal to the United States and while 
working for the United States, has for its main purpose the presentation of facts 
to responsible people in order that Croatia will not end up after the present 
world war under the yoke of Serbia or under Communist rule.”93 Ramušćak 
also said that the organization prefers an independent Croatia, but it advocates 
a plebiscite after the war, and if Croats decided to live under Serbia, then that 
is all right for the organization.
87   Ibid., p. 2.
88   Ibid., p. 2.
89   Ibid., p. 4.
90   Ibid.
91   Ibid.
92   Ibid., p. 12.
93   Ibid., p. 12.
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Abbe included reports of other special agents from several different cities 
in the United States who interviewed prominent Croats or individuals close to 
them, such as; Vincent Ujčić, Vlaho Vlahović, and John Krešić of New York 
City, Vincent L. Knaus, Josip Baždarić, Father Bojanić, and Stjepan Vrančić 
of Chicago, and Francis S. Kollander of Gary, Indiana. All of them confirmed, 
with relative accuracy, that Hrvatski Domobran had not been renewed and that 
the SCAC did not represent its continuation, although many individuals who 
once belonged to the former organization were active members of the latter. 
At the end, R. E. Abbe provided the most basic information on the leading 
members of the SCAC: Father David Zrno, Father Boniface D. Sorić, Rudolf 
Erić, and J. P. Miller. 
On November 18, 1944, John S. P. Wilson from Pittsburgh sent a report 
made in Cleveland on Hrvatski Domobran (Croatian Defenders), even though 
the report dealt with the Supreme Council of American Croats that was 
recently organized in Cleveland with Father Ivan Stipanović of Youngstown, 
Ohio as President.94 Other officers were Silvije Grubišić, Secretary, Ivan Krešić, 
President of the Croatian Circle, and Josip Kraja, Treasurer of the Croatian 
Circle.95 Besides confusing “Slovakians” and “Slavs”, the agent reported that 
most Croats in the Summer County in Ohio were “pro-Russian and very 
much in accord with the Teheran Agreement.”96 He also conveyed that most 
people who belonged to the Croatian Home Defenders have become inactive 
since the organization dissolved nationally in 1941. The organizers of the new 
organization were former members of the Croatian Home Defenders and the 
Croatian Circle, the two organizations that were formerly opposed to each 
other on the grounds of divergent stances toward the Independent State of 
Croatia. 
The movement of american Croatians for the Democratic freedom 
of Croatia
By the end of 1944, American policy-makers had long decided the post-
war world order. The most significant American Croat organization, the CFU, 
greatly influenced by the Communists, had also decided which side they would 
support. They had for some time backed the Communist-led Partisans in 
former Yugoslavia and they did not have any reason to switch sides, especially 
when the United States Government had also backed the same side. 
Nonetheless, some American Croats deeply distrusted the Communists 
and hoped to be able to change the minds of American policy-makers. Most 
94   Federal Bureau of Investigation, File No. 97-82, NA 860H.01/11-illegible OS/0.
95   Ibid., p. 5.
96   Ibid., p. 2. 
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of them were either members of the Catholic clergy in America or their close 
associates and friends. These Croats had founded another organization of 
American Croats, the Movement of American Croatians for the Democratic 
Freedom of Croatia.97 On December 9, 1944, they sent a Memorandum 
to the United States President F. D. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State R. 
Stettinius.98
The Memorandum stated from the beginning that its reason for writing 
was “the serious problems which, at this time, face their motherland – 
CROATIA.”99 After a lengthy survey of Croatian history, the signatories tried 
to depict the forces that were struggling against each other in the present war: 
the Fascists, Nazis, Mihailovich’s Chetnicks, and finally the Partisans, led by 
an obscure figure, Josip Broz, who called himself Tito, “an agent of the Third 
Internationale.”100 The signatories of the Memorandum pointed out that Tito’s 
units had killed hundreds of Catholic priests in the most atrocious ways, yet 
he was praised in the United States as a hero and an ally. They pleaded for 
help so that the Croatian people would be protected from “destruction and 
extermination”101 and concluded with demands stated in six points: 1. “That 
the Atlantic Charter be applied to the Croatian People” and that it becomes 
“the foundation upon which the sovereignty of Croatia be re-established.” 2. 
“That no new ideology … be imposed upon the Croatian People against their 
will.” 3. That no new dictatorship be imposed upon Croats. 4. “That the United 
States, Great Britain and other World leaders take into their confidence those 
Croatian leaders who are not communist.” 5. That those who emigrated “may 
not be turned into communist legions”. 6. They “condemn all those who wish 
to promote, or who are promoting the communist cause upon our people here 
and abroad.”102
Even if the Memorandum had been more skillfully composed, it would 
have served no useful purpose, because those who, on a daily basis, were 
getting closer to complete victory had decided the course of history. A minor 
bureaucrat at the State Department politely acknowledged the reception of the 
Memorandum.103 The official Croatian government (NDH) was on the side of 
the losers, while the Communists, who had proclaimed the founding of a new 
97   Rev. Fr. I. Čuvalo of Ambridge, Ohio was the president, Nick Filipovich of Farrel, Pennsylvania, 
Vice-president, Rudolph Erich of Akron, Ohio the Secretary, and Mary Janich of Youngstown, Ohio 
the Treasurer.
98   Memorandum to Governments, leading Statesmen and Religious Leaders, Publicists and News 
Agencies of the World regarding the true Status of Croatia and its People, together with their Strug-
gle for Independence, NA MP 860H.01/1- illegible, Roll, 23.
99   Ibid., p. 2.
100   Ibid., p. 5.
101   Ibid., p. 6.
102   Ibid., p. 7.
103   J. M. Colton Hand to Rev. Ljubo Cuvalo, NA MP 860h.01/12-944. 
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federal Yugoslavia, also had a clear idea as to what the fate of Croats in the new 
Yugoslavia would be.  
Conclusion
It is not surprising that governments in wartime situations consider some 
of their citizens a danger for national security and that they watch over their 
activities. It is a matter for speculation as to whether the government of the 
United States of America would have considered Croatian Americans such a 
danger during WWII had it not accepted the urgings of the Yugoslav Legation 
in the USA to watch over its citizens of Croatian descent. Once the FBI 
and other government institutions accepted the possibility that Croats may 
represent such a danger, they applied a strict scrutiny of prominent leaders 
in the Croatian community, Croatian journals, and institutions, even after 
repeated reports suggested that accusations against Croats were the result of 
Serbian propaganda and that further surveillance was not necessary. 
It is also a matter for speculation as to whether the anti-Croatian frenzy 
contributed to the Communist penetration of organizations of Croatian 
Americans and to the support of Croatian Americans for the Communists-
led Partisans in Croatia, which ultimately helped the renewal of Yugoslavia, 
ruled for 45 years by Communists. American agencies responsible for 
national security reacted, of course, to dangers regardless of their ideological 
colors, but they were, it seems, much more sensitive to the “Fascist” than 
“Communist” threats. By the time they became aware of the Communist 
onslaught on organizations of Croatian Americans, those organizations were 
almost completely permeated by Communist agents. Those who warned of the 
Communist menace, primarily Catholic priests and their close collaborators, 
were considered not only conservative and backward oriented individuals, 
but also themselves sympathizers of the Nazis and of their collaborators in 
Europe.
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Kommunistische Penetration in kroatisch-amerikanische Vereine in den 
Vereinigten Staaten von amerika während des Zweiten Weltkrieges
Zusammenfassung
Auf Initiative der jugoslawischen Botschaft in Washington und auf persön-
liche Initiative des Ministers Konstantin Fotić untersuchten amerikanische Si-
cherheitsdienste, vor allem FBI, Benehmen und Schreiben von angesehenen 
Bürgern kroatischer Herkunft und kroatischen Vereinen, sowie Zeitungen, 
die in kroatischer Sprache erschienen, und überwachten sie. Diese Beaufsich-
tigungen dauerten weiter sogar auch nach wiederholten Berichten, in denen 
suggeriert wurde, dass die Klagen gegen Kroaten eigentlich Resultat serbischer 
Propaganda waren und dass weitere Aufsicht dieser Subjekte nicht notwendig 
ist.
Es ist nicht ganz klar, ob die antikroatische Hysterie dem Eindringen der 
Kommunisten in die Organisationen amerikanischer Kroaten beigetragen 
hatte und die Unterstützung der Partisanen in Kroatien angeregt hatte, was 
endlich zur Wiederaufbau Jugoslawiens geholfen hat, das die Kommunisten 
45 Jahre lang unter ihrer totalitärer Kontrolle hatten. Die amerikanischen für 
nationale Sicherheit verantwortlichen Agenturen reagierten natürlich auf Ge-
fahren ohne Rücksicht auf ihre ideologischen Färbungen. Es scheint aber, dass 
sie doch größeren Wert auf “faschistische” als auf “kommunistische” Drohun-
gen legten. Bis zum Moment als sie der kommunistischen Angriffe auf die Ver-
eine amerikanischer Kroaten gewahr wurden, wurden diese Organisationen 
fast vollständig von kommunistischen Agenten überflutet. Hier zeigte sich 
noch einmal, dass praktische Politik von Schließung bedingungsloser Allian-
zen ihren Preis hat, der manchmal sogar zu hoch sein kann.
Die amerikanischen Agenturen, verantwortlich für innere Sicherheit und 
Sammeln von Angaben, vor allem das FBI, waren nicht immer genug vorsi-
chtig in Auswahl seiner Zuträger, was ernsthafte Folgen für amerikanische 
Kroaten haben könnte und häufig auch hatte. Es ist ziemlich klar, dass die 
Zuträger serbischer Herkunft meistens die Möglichkeit ausgenützt haben, um 
unter den amerikanischen Agenten die gegen Kroaten gerichtete Propaganda 
zu treiben. Unglückselige Natur einer solchen Praxis ist am leichtesten in dau-
ernder Implementierung gewisser propagandistischen Elemente in Kreierung 
der Politik Kroatien gegenüber seitens späterer amerikanischer Administra-
tionen und dafür verantwortlicher Einzelner zu sehen.  
